Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 8

Number 2

Article 9

1-1-2008

Global Integration and the Complete Public Goods
Sungjoon Cho

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil

Recommended Citation
Cho, Sungjoon (2008) "Global Integration and the Complete Public Goods," Chicago Journal of
International Law: Vol. 8: No. 2, Article 9.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol8/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Global Integration and the Complete Public Goods
Sungjoon Cho*
I. INTRODUCTION
Chris Brummer's article1 offers a refreshing perspective in understanding
trade regionalism. Borrowing economic insights, Brummer argues that regional
trading within regional integration agreements ("RIAs") or regional trade
agreements ("RTAs' is a club good. Analogous to a club membership in a
swimming pool, members of RTAs share benefits of liberalization and
integration exclusively among members (excludability) and one member's
utilization of the benefits does not usually affect that of other members
(nonrivalrousness) until an oversize membership structure causes congestion and
thus results in disutility of members. Yet Brummer's view is that RTAs produce
incomplete club goods for two reasons. First, the disparity among members in
size and economic power may lead to different congestion points for different
members. This heterogeneous congestion departs from a normal club good
which exhibits only a single congestion point. Second, the original excludability
can be diluted by nonmember freeriding on liberalization and integration
benefits. This weak exclusion tends to compromise the exclusive nature of club
goods.
My response to Brummer's article is more complementary than critical.
Concededly, some of his assumptions and methodology are subject to criticism
in that they may be challenged normatively or may fail fully to capture realities.
For example, an economic approach toward RTAs, which slights many critical
noneconomic considerations in forming and operating them, may be criticized
as an attempt to commodify regional trade and thereby debase it.2 Furthermore,
Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. My
gratitude to Stacy Chen and the staff of the Chicago Journal of International Law for their
excellent work. All errors are mine.
I

Chris Brummer, RegionalIntegration and Incomplete Club Goods:A Trade Perspective, 8 Chi J Intl L 535

2

(2008).
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw, 24 Yale J Intl L 1,
48 (1999).

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

these regional trades as social goods may be incommensurable among one
another: they cannot be quantified and measured by certain metric units to be
compared.' Obviously, the purpose of the European Union ("EU") goes beyond
a mere economic integration, and so does that of the Association of South East
Asian Nations ("ASEAN"). After all, each member of an RTA may have its own
unique reasons for joining the club, not only economic but also socio-political.
However, this criticism, albeit legitimate, should not unduly diminish the
novel contribution that Brummer's article makes: exploring a new avenue to
grapple with RTAs via a microscopic investigation of intra-bloc dynamics.
Rather than delving into inevitable weaknesses that are inherent in his
methodology, I will take a different yet highly complementary angle, as the title
of this Article may imply. While Brummer's article mostly concerns an inwardlooking analysis of RTAs, my Article takes an outward-looking approach, which
his article addresses on a limited scale in its last section.
My main concern in this Article is for the negative externalities ("public
bads") which self-fulfilling, self-optimizing RTAs may inflict on nonmembers
and the global trading system as a whole. RTAs produce negative externalities
vis-a-vis nonmembers in that various costs generated by the existence of RTAs,
such as trade diversion or fragmentation of the global trading system, are borne
not by members of those RTAs but by nonmembers, and more broadly by the
global trading system as a whole.4 As each bloc seldom considers and
internalizes this serious social cost, this collective action problem eventually
harms members and nonmembers alike, since RTA members remain part of the
global trading system. The history of interwar economic balkanization
precipitated by mercantilist competition among regional trading blocs
corroborates this reflection.'
Markedly, the obverse side of RTA externalities is positive externalities
("public goods"), furnished by the global trading system in which RTAs can be
constructive building blocks. A complementary, symbiotic relationship between

3

Id.

4
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the World Trade Organization ("WTO")7 and RTAs is capable of realizing
public goods for the global trading system. Diffusive effects of trade creation
can expand regional trade to global trade, which can further boost regional trade.
This virtuous circle of trade creation can, and should, be engineered by
multilateralizing RTAs. 8 This holistic approach to breaking the barrier between
multilateralism and regionalism is inevitably normative.9 Although it may be
framed as a positive methodology using economic concepts of public goods and
externalities, it is normative in that it presupposes what is desirable and
undesirable for the global trading system, which is a fundamental question in
defining public goods and bads for the purpose of this Article. 10 In other words,
it reveals the telos of the multilateral trading system-an integrated and thus
sustainable trading system.11
This Article unfolds as follows: Section I1 first situates RTAs against the
backdrop of the global trading system in an effort to bring out RTAs' global
implications. Section III highlights certain negative effects of RTAs on
nonmembers and the global trading system, and demonstrates how the club
goods of regional trade may turn into public bads. In particular, this Section
describes three aspects of negative externalities that RTAs may occasion:
negative externalities to the global trading system as a whole, those to individual
economic players (global businesspeople) within the system, and those to poor
nations. In order to address these negative externalities, Section IV suggests
multilateralizing RTAs in a way that allows coexistence with the WTO in a
coherent fashion. It raises three multilateralizing strategies that reduce or
eliminate the preferential features of RTAs: sharing regional liberalization and
integration with the outer world (open regionalism), active alliances between and
among RTAs (institutional merger), and WTO-consistent interpretation by
regional trade tribunals (judicial convergence). Section V concludes that
institutionalization, such as RTAs, is only instrumental to the government's
enlightened will to liberalize trade, which should be prioritized.

7

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol 1 (1994), 33 ILM 1125, 1144-53 (1994) ("Final
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II. PUTTING TRADE REGIONALISM IN PERSPECTIVE:
REGIONAL INTEGRATION VERSUS GLOBAL DISINTEGRATION

Brummer's club goods thesis focuses mainly on an internal dynamic of
RTA members in particular and regional integration in general. However, this
regional integration needs to be put in the broader perspective of the global
trading system because no RTA is an island, especially in this highly
interdependent world. Although RTAs can affect the global trading system in a
positive way via spillover effects of trade creation, history is rife with negative
occurrences such as trade diversion and the consequent disintegration of the
global trading system. For example, the interwar tussle among regional trading
blocs precipitated economic balkanization on a global scale and eventually
contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. 2 In this sense, history
eloquently demonstrates that RTAs can be a fatal public bad to the global
trading system.
In his classic work on RTAs, Jacob Viner articulated these positive and
negative contributions of RTAs to the global trading system. 3 Viner observed
that:
From the free-trade point of view, whether a particular customs union is a
move in the right or in the wrong direction depends.., on which of the
two types of consequences ensue from that custom union.
Where the trade-creating force is predominant, one of the members at least
must benefit, both may benefit, the two combined must have a net benefit,
and the world at large benefits; but the outside world loses, in the short-run
at least, and can gain in the long-run only as the result of the general
diffusion of the increased prosperity of the customs union area. Where the
trade-diverting effect is predominant, at least one of the member countries is
bound to be injured, both may be injured, the two combined will suffer a
net injury, and there will be injury to the outside world and to the world at
14
large.

The multilateral discipline over RTAs (GATT Article XXIV) corresponds
with Viner's observation. Paragraph 4 of Article XXIV both recognizes RTAs'
contributions to global integration (the "desirability of increasing freedom of
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration")
and cautions against their potential demerits to the global trading system ("not
to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories")."

12
13
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See Clavin, The Triumph of Regionalsm at 31-33 (cited in note 5).
Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue 44 (Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace 1950).
Id (emphasis added).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art XXIV,
Set 194 (1947) ("GATT").

4, 61 Stat A-11, TIAS 1700, 55 UN Treaty
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To guard against these potential downsides, Article XXIV provides internal, 6
external," and procedural 8 requirements that any RTA should meet to remain
valid under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). In sum,
GATT Article XXIV, drafted after the world learned its lessons from the
economic balkanization of trading blocs, envisions RTAs as "building blocks,"
or public goods, not "stumbling blocks," or public bads. Unfortunately,
however, this Article has proved to be mostly hortatory rather than fully
operative in disciplining RTAs along the lines of multilateral norms. 9 In the
absence of legal disciplines, RTAs have exhibited their many dark sidesnegative externalities to the global trading system.
III. DARK SIDES OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS: CLUB
GOODS AS PUBLIC BADS
RTAs may reduce global efficiency by creating multiple inward-looking
trading blocs, if trade diversion, which these blocs inevitably generate, fails to be
fully compensated by trade creation which they may realize in the long-term.
This fragmentation of world trade is an enormous public bad to the global
trading community. The flip side of the RTAs' exclusive, members-only nature is
that RTAs divert potential trade from nonmembers and instead replace it with
intra-bloc trade. The economic effects of this preferential treatment may be
analogous to subsidizing member countries' producers, resulting in global
market distortion. In addition, regulatory heterogeneity from diverging
regulatory standards among different RTAs tends to burden the global trading
community because it imposes often prohibitive transaction costs on exporters.
Last but not least, RTAs often aggravate development concerns by
disadvantaging poor countries when they deteriorate these countries' terms of
trade. These three failures of RTAs can be translated into three public bads for
the global trading system in that they, like pollution, generate certain social costs
to the global trading community without bearing them.

16

17
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Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV provides that substantially all trade between and among the
constituent territories should be liberalized. Id.
Paragraph 5 of Article XX1V prescribes that the sum of all tariffs and other trade barriers after
the formation of RTAs should not be higher than those before the formation. Id.
Paragraph 7 of Article XXIV states that RTA members should notify the GATT of their plans to
launch RTAs. Id.
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A. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES TO THE GLOBAL
TRADING SYSTEM

RTAs fragment world trade and thus reduce global efficiency due to their
exclusive nature. The classical Vinerian trade diversion has been welldocumented, as discussed below. Trade diversion may be too serious to be
compensated for by trade creation. A network of RTAs may still create less trade
than would otherwise exist under the global trading system.20 Empirical studies
demonstrate that even well-established RTAs, such as NAFTA and
MERCOSUR, have eventually been detrimental to nonmembers, failing to
realize broader trade creation on a global scale.2' More seriously, regional trading
blocs tend to compete with one another and thus trap themselves in a prisoners'
dilemma, as demonstrated by colonialist competition in the early twentieth
22
century.
The main engines powering this fragmentation are the "rules of origin."
The rules of origin create a screening mechanism with which to locate the titular
"originating goods ' 23 eligible for preferential treatments and thus prevent
nonmember countries' goods from freeriding on such treatments. This
labyrinthine set of "technical and seemingly innocuous details" defies any
reasonable attempt to comprehend it.24 Its bizarre complexity derives from the
protectionist architecture embedded in RTAs: rent-seeking domestic industries
lobby and capture trade negotiators into manipulating the rules in a way that can
shield them from foreign competition. Domestic producers want to avoid trade
deflection under which nonmembers in the global supply chain take advantage
of duty-free access to member countries' markets.

23

Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford, and David G. Tarr, Rules of Thumb for Evaluating
PreferentialTradingArrangements: Evidencefrom Computable GeneralEquilibriumAssessments, World Bank
Dev Econ Dept Report No 3149 (2003), available online at <http://econ.worldbank.org/
external/de fault/main?pagePK= 64165259&piPK=64165421 &theSitePK=469372&menuPK =
64216926&entitylD=000160016_20031215112948> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Alexander J. Yeats, Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade
Arrangements?, 12 World Bank Econ Rev 1, 1 (1998) (describing the trade diversion effects of
MERCOSUR); John Romalis, NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on InternationalTrade, 1 Nadi Bur of
Econ Rsrch, Working Paper 11059, 26-27 (2005) (determining that NAFTA has increased output
and prices in many sectors by driving out nonmember imports).
See Andrew Porter, European Imperialism 1860-1914, 60-64 (MacMillan 1994). Colonialist
competition is a historical example of a "danger of regional agreement being used to establish
competing regional hegemons." Stephen Woolcock, Regional Integration and the MulilateralTrading
System, in Geiger and Kennedy, eds, ComplementaryPaths 115 (cited in note 5).
See North-American Free Trade Agreement (1992), art 401, 32 ILM 289, 349 (1993) ("NAFTA").
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Lan Cao, Coeporateand ProductIdentity in the PostnationalEconomy: Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 Cal
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L Rev 401,410 (2002).

Vol 8 No. 2

GlobalIntegrationand the Complete Public Goods

For example, US garment producers would not allow rivals in one of the
NAFTA partners (such as Mexico) to manufacture and to export duty-free
competitive shirts and trousers made from cheap yet high-quality Indian yarn.
Under NAFTA, those Mexican garment products could enjoy preferential (dutyfree) access to the US markets only ifthe yarn also originated from NAFTA
members ("yarn-forward" rule). Due to this arbitrary origin rule, India as a
nonmember suffers deeply. Obviously, India's direct textile exports to NAFTA
markets would decrease. Moreover, potential foreign direct investments toward
India for the purpose of manufacturing textile and apparel products exportable
to the US would be replaced by such investments to NAFTA members.
In addition to trade and foreign direct investment diversion, most RTAs
further impede global trade by carving out sensitive products from the list of
trade liberalization. Examples abound: the Japan-Singapore FTA (2003)
excluded many agricultural and textile products; both the US-Australia FTA
(2004) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") (2004)
failed to cover sugar; and the Mexico-Japan FTA (2004) left out a number of
service areas, such as automobile maintenance services, business services,
construction, entertainment, and telecommunication, in addition to traditional
sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and livestock. 2i These protectionist
exemptions are more structural than anecdotal. They tend to "cement domestic
constituencies[ ]"which will also resist multilateral trade liberalization.26 Hence,
we find yet another dimension of negative externalities to the global trading
system in the long run.
B. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES TO GLOBAL BUSINESS
The global trading system comprises not only trading nations but also a
myriad of individual economic players, such as producers, importers,
transporters, financiers, insurers, consumers, and investors.27 From a practical
standpoint, the aforementioned negative externalities to the global trading

25

26

27

See Cho, 27 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 64 (cited in note 8); US-Australia ETA Omits Sugar, 21 Intl
Trade Rep (BNA), No 255 at 260 (Feb 12, 2004); Five GetAn.xious, Economist 38 (May 29, 2004);
Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic
Partnership, (2004), available online at <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/JPN-MEXDraftEPAe/JPN MEXinde.asp> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
World Trade Organization, Annual Report by the Director-General, Overview of Developments in the
InternationalTrading Environment, 87, WTO Doc No WT/TPR/OV/8 (Nov 15, 2002).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, 7.76, WTO Doc No WT/DS152/R a an 27, 2000) ("United States Sections 301') (noting
that "the multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed
mostly, of individual economic operators").
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system are translated immediately into negative externalities to global business.
In this regard, a WTO panel aptly observed that:
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is
through improved conditions for these private operators that Members
benefit from WIO disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which
flows from a breach is often indirect and results from the impact of the
breach on the market place and the activities of individuals within it.28
Recent technological breakthroughs in the areas of communication and
logistics have blessed global business with global supply chains in which they can
optimize production via global sourcing. 29 For example, a retailer can purchase
fibers from one country, have it sewn, woven, and needled in another country,
dyed and printed in a third country, and shipped to its export market. The
retailer, a global businessperson, can reduce the production cost dramatically
through this global sourcing in comparison with traditional single-source
manufacturing. However, the "spaghetti bowl"-like messiness of rules of
origin,3" which the disarray of numerous RTAs create on account of embedded
complexities and uncertainties, seriously deters such global optimization. The
same end-product could have different national origins under different rules,
and thus could be subject to different tariff rates. Enormous transaction costs
are incurred by global business in administering this unfathomable legal mess, let
alone the heavy paperwork. Worse, importers might be fined if they submit
wrong claims based on incorrect interpretation of rules of origin.31 While big
companies may be able to afford these enormous risks and transaction costs,
small businesses may not internalize such unfortunate negative externalities.3 2
Another public bad to global business results from the regulatory
heterogeneity that proliferating RTAs inevitably create. Many social regulations
in areas that most RTAs concern, such as the environment, human health and
safety, labor, and intellectual property, often diverge from those covered by

28

Id at

29

See generally Sungjoon Cho, Change DistortedRules, Natl LJ 27 (May 7, 2007).

7.77.

30

World Trade Organization, Consultative Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WFTO:

31

Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, 19 (an 17, 2005), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/lOanniv-e/future-wtoe.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007);
Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democray 290
(1998).
See Tim Tatsuji Shimazaki, Proof of Origin as a Trade Barrier (1998), reprinted in Ralph H. Folsom,
Michael Wallace Gordon, and David Lopez, eds, NAFTA: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook 65-66
(West 2000) (explaining that importers and exporters may be subject to penalties, in addition to
normal tariff rates, when they make even good-faith mistakes in claiming preferential status under
the NAFTA Rules of Origin).

32

Victor Fung, BilateralDeals Destroy Global Trade, Fin Times 13 (Nov 4, 2005).
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WTO norms, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade33 and the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.34 Each RTA tends to
entertain a different type of regulatory capture and thus produces a different
structure and different level of regulatory protection. As Michael Malloy has
aptly observed, these diverging regulatory jurisdictions among RTAs tend to
cause costly traffic like "uncoordinated, regionalized bumper cars [which] carom
around the internationalized area."36 Undoubtedly, this regulatory heterogeneity
is a serious obstacle to regulatory convergence at the multilateral level. As a
global businessperson, it would be nightmarish to establish multiple production
lines for the same product to meet these diverse regulations in different regional
markets. This regulatory heterogeneity is yet another costly, often prohibitive,
trade barrier to nonmember countries' producers.
C. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES TO THE WORLD'S
POOREST COUNTRIES
Large RTAs tend to disadvantage small economies and thus exacerbate
development concerns in the global trading community. Large blocs create an
artificial gain in terms of trade by internal market integration and the consequent
economies of scale at the expense of small nonmembers." Therefore, these
terms of trade may contribute to uneven distribution of benefits from trade
liberalization and a widening income gap between the rich and the poor.38 This is
a serious negative externality to those poor countries which are not members of
large RTAs.

33

34

35

36

37

38

WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in The Results of the
Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 138 (GATTSecretariat 1994).
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, The Results of the Uruguay Round ofJMulilateralTrade Negoliaions:The Legal Texts 69 (GATT
Secretariat 1994).
For example, the EU provides a very strict and sophisticated set of regulations on genetically
modified organisms, while NAFTA has no prominent disciplines on the same issue, except for
the publication of certain nonbinding advisory reports. See European Commission, From the Farm
to the Fork, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/index-en.htm>
(visited Nov 17, 2007); North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Maize &
Biodiversio: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico, available
online
at
<http://www.cec.org/maize/index.cfmvarlan=english> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in InternationalRegulation, 60 Fordham L Rev
S, S22 (1992).
Ben Zissimos and David Vines, Is the WITO's Artide XXIV a Free Trade Barrier?,Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper No 49/00 (2000), available online at
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2000/wp4900.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
Id.
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Even if poor countries seal bilateral trade deals with rich countries for the
former's protection, these deals may be developmentally pernicious to poor
countries as a whole. This somewhat counterintuitive proposition has been
demonstrated by a recent study using the Global Trade Analysis Project
database.39 This study has hypothesized that all developing countries sign
bilateral trade agreements with rich trading partners, such as the United States,
the European Union, Japan, and Canada, and examined whether these
developing countries would gain from these deals in the end. The outcome is
telling. While the multilateral trade liberalization would create a gain of US$109
billion to developing countries in 2015, bilateral deals would cause them a loss of
US$22 billion.4 ° More alarmingly, this loss tends to fall disproportionately upon
low income countries (US$19 billion), as compared with middle income
countries (US$2.6 billion).41
IV. MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: TURNING CLUB
GOODS/PUBLIC BADS TO PUBLIC GOODS
Under Brummer's assumptions of RTAs as club goods, RTAs are
commodified. The preferential market access that RTAs provide exclusively to
members are viewed as goods that can be consumed for certain utility. Two
attributes characterize such goods. First, those goods are excludable: RTA
members can prevent nonmembers from enjoying duty-free access to their
markets by preserving tariffs and other trade restrictions against nonmembers.
Second, those goods are rivalrous: "[when] one unit of the good is consumed by
'4 2
one individual, it detracts from the consumption opportunities of others."
However, unlike other "normal" (private) goods, this rivalrousness does not
exist in club goods like
RTAs until the number of members increases to the
43
point of "congestion.
A. RETHINKING EXCLUDABILITY
The club model hypothesis encapsulates a fundamental character of RTAs:
preferentialism. First, clubbiness is synonymous with excludability, which can be

39

Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Richard Newfarmer, and Martha Denisse Pierola, Regionalism
vs. Multilateralism?,in Richard Newfarmer, ed, Trade, Doha and Development: A Window into the Issues
309, 311-14 (World Bank 2005).

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Brummer, 8 ChiJ Intl L at 538 (cited in note 1).

43

Id. Brummer has added that RTAs are "incomplete" club goods in that a single RTA can have
multiple equilibria for congestion. Id at 551.
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translated as mercantilist reciprocity in that regional market opening (import) is
granted to members only in exchange for matching regional market access
(export). The underlying logic is that an RTA member "buys" its preferential
access to RTA markets as one purchases a swim club membership: by giving
other members preferential access to its own market if one pays the membership
fee. Nonetheless, this aspect of clubbiness (excludability) is fluid, as Brummer
has recognized. 44 For example, RTA members often offer the same preferential
trade benefits that they enjoy to certain nonmembers. 4
Furthermore, if one departs from the underlying rationale of reciprocity in
trade liberalization, excludability no longer seems essential. Even without an
export, an import alone can bring the importing country a good deal of benefits,
such as enhanced consumer welfare. In fact, more trade barriers have been
dismantled by unilateral, nonreciprocal trade liberalization than by reciprocal
trade negotiations."6 An RTA may adopt an open membership without requiring
any binding reciprocal concessions of members, as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation ("APEC") example below suggests.47
B. RETHINKING RIVALROUSNESS
In a swim club model, one member's access to one market does not
diminish another member's access to the same market, as long as the former
does not inconvenience the other's use of the club. Yet if too many members
aim for access to the same market ("congestion"), the original nonrivalrousness
assumption no longer works, just as an overcrowded swim club would affect
members' full enjoyment of it. Interestingly, Brummer has argued that each
member of an RTA would find a different equilibrium of congestion depending
on its economic size. 48
However, the very idea of congestion is yet another brainchild of
mercantilism with an entropic vision. It conjures up a limited market space or
demands which would be gradually taken away and eventually exhausted by an
44

Id at 545-48.

45

Id at 546.

4

See Section V.

47

See Section IV.C.I.
Brummer, 8 Chi J Intl L at 545 (cited in note 1).

48

Members will have their own preferences as to the extent and size of regional
integration where congestion arises at different points for each country.
Moreover, congestion will depend on-and indeed be defined by-something
other than the mere number of members in a regional organization, as classical
club theory postulates. Instead, congestion will reflect the qualitative make up
of the group and comprise a function of the comparative advantages (or
disadvantages) of the markets new members represent.
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increasing number of (mutually crowding) members. However, trade is not a
static phenomenon. The total volume of trade is not fixed as of the day an RTA
is created. Trade is continuously created as new products and new transactions
are added to RTA markets. In other words, there is no cause for congestion in
the market because the market itself gets bigger as it develops.
If the notion of congestion is defensible, we should be able to obtain the
optimal size of an RTA or the optimal number of members of the RTA.
However, this optimality remains largely theoretical, since most RTAs have very
limited memberships and seldom expand. When they do expand, their expansion
is driven more by long-term economic gains of deeper integration as well as
noneconomic considerations such as security, rather than by short-term
mercantilist tradeoffs such as congestion.49 Furthermore, the notion of
competitiveness
employed
to
explain
congestion
is
misleading. 0
Competitiveness may apply to individual firms, but not to countries. Even if
Country A is stronger economically than Country B in every aspect, Country B
can still export some goods to Country A as long as Country B enjoys a
comparative, if not absolute, advantage vis-A-vis Country A in some area (for
example, labor-intensive goods).
C. CREATING A COMPLETE PUBLIC GOOD: TOWARD
MULTILATERALIZED TRADE REGIONALISM
Brummer has submitted that the incompleteness of the club goods nature
of RTAs would enhance free trade and global efficiency by allowing freeriders,
or nonmembers, to share whatever preferential benefits were originally reserved
exclusively for members. However, having considered potential negative
externalities that RTAs are capable of imposing on the global trading system, we
need to take a more proactive approach. In other words, beyond the point of
merely benefiting from RTAs' inability to exclude others entirely, we should
vigorously cultivate various means to multilateralize RTAs to extend
inclusiveness. This is tantamount to creating a complete public good for the
global trading community.5' This public good is complete in that it tends to
49

See, for example, European Commission, Enlargement, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/index_en.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Enlargement is a carefully managed process
which helps the transformation of the countries involved, extending peace, stability, pro_5oeriy,
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provide positive externalities for both members and nonmembers of RTAs. In
this sense, RTAs can complement, not replace, the WTO. The WTO can be a
public good to RTAs, and vice versa.
Under this public good model of multilateralized trade regionalism,
excludability no longer exists, since the barrier between an RTA and the outer
world is broken. While RTAs facilitate and promote regional liberalization and
integration among geographically proximate nations, benefits from such
liberalization and integration may be shared by nonmembers. When an RTA
merges with another to form a larger RTA, the previous excludability tends to
decrease to the extent that the new RTA has more members than any prior
RTA. This results in a smaller degree of fragmentation of the global trading
system, creating an institutional merger. Rivalrousness due to congestion is also
unlikely, since regional trade is continuously created as it is integrated into global
trade. In fact, the volume of intra-bloc trade tends to decrease and that of interbloc trade tends to increase as an RTA become more mature. 2 Finally, even
when the aforementioned modes of institutional multilateralization are not
available, some type of convergence or coherence in judicial practices or
jurisprudences between the RTA tribunal and the WTO tribunal can mitigate
negative externalities of RTAs, and can produce positive externalities by
providing the global trading system with more predictability.
1. Open Regionalism
Multilateralization begins with breaking the hermetical nature of
regionalism. Unlocking RTAs signifies a departure from their core attributeexcludability. RTAs, at least at a certain period of time after formation, should
offer their preferential concessions to the rest of the global trading community.
At any rate, those preferential treatments tend to erode eventually, as some
members form new RTAs with other countries or open their markets
unilaterally. When they open their preferential club, RTA members need not
seek a quid-pro-quo type of reciprocal concession from nonmembers, save the
latter's commitment to good faith liberalization efforts, if the former abandon
the old mercantilist obsession. Market opening itself is of value to the opening
countries's economic welfare. From a more mature, communitarian perspective,
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reciprocity need not be commercially calculated and balanced but may rather
become diffuse, although it can still discourage uncooperative behaviors such as
freeriding even without selective incentives.
APEC is a case in point. APEC was established in 1989 to promote trade
and investment liberalization, as well as to deepen economic cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region. Its unique institutional features, such as soft institutionalism
and a nonbinding structure, distinguish it from many other RTAs. Most of all,
APEC's strong commitment to the multilateral trading system has been its
defining characteristic.5 4 Unlike preferential regional trading blocs, APEC
members' trade and investment liberalization are meant to be shared by both
members and nonmembers.5 5 In this sense, APEC is truly a building block of the
WTO. In 1994, APEC announced its bold liberalization blueprint, dubbed the
"Bogor Declaration," in which members committed themselves to achieve fullfledged trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020
(2010 for developed countries).6 This blueprint was elaborated, implemented,
and even expedited by a series of subsequent initiatives: the Osaka Action
Agenda " in 1995, Manila Action Plan for APEC 58 in 1996, and the Early
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization program in 1997. 59
This ambitious trade and investment liberalization scheme, which exceeds
the WTO both in terms of scope and depth, was made possible by APEC's soft
institutionalization, defined by its nonbinding nature and voluntarism. APEC's
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experimental informalism6 ° or "minilateralism,"' has made APEC a rehearsal
stage before a grand opening in the WTO. A Chinese government official once
stated that "the WTO is like a lovely banquet, and APEC is the kitchen where
the food is prepared."62 Despite this soft nature, APEC has performed quite well
in terms of liberalization. Under the APEC scheme, Japan and Singapore vowed
to liberalize their telecommunications market; Japan increased the number of US
auto dealerships; China allowed foreigners to lease farmland; and Korea opened
its construction market to foreigners.6 3 Even in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, APEC members refused to backpedal from their previous voluntary
commitments. 64
The APEC model suggests a feasible path to multilateralization. RTA
members, especially after they have achieved some degree of regional
integration, need not be reluctant to open their regional markets to the outer
world. Trade is meant to be expansive, not isolated. When a country imports
another nation's goods and services, it gets more than just those tradables. The
importing country also learns about the other's culture, technology, and
economic system, which helps it to export more tradables to that country. If a
substantial number of countries follow this path, a culture of liberalization can
emerge and lead to a virtuous circle of trade liberalization.
Admittedly, open regionalism presupposes a leap of faith in liberal trade
among trading nations. They should at least tame, if not eliminate, mercantilist
politics when it comes to market opening. It all starts on the home front: "all
politics is local., 61 More than anything, we need a fair amount of social
marketing to educate domestic constituencies-who, importantly, are also
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voters--on the true cost of protectionism and the true benefit of liberalization
lest they should elect myopic populists.66
2. Institutional Merger
Another way of adapting RTAs to the multilateral trading system may be to
broaden their trade horizons by fusing them institutionally. This phenomenon of
institutional merger has the potential to multilateralize bilateral and regional
trade relations, since it tends to diffuse enhanced market access to the larger part
of the global trading community. In an ideal situation, a web of these mergers, if
it ever passes a critical point, may generate something close to a "universal
customs union."67 However, a number of failed attempts have been witnessed:
between the EU and MERCOSUR; between the EU and NAFTA; between the
EU and the US; and among NAFTA, the CACM, and MERCOSUR (Free Trade
68
Agreement of Americas, or "FTAA").
The level of ambition in an institutional merger should be adjusted
according to the complex challenges that these attempts have encountered.
These mega-RTA projects tend to generate new cultural or political dynamics
among interest groups in countries that may not necessarily favor such projects.
For example, some Latin American countries have protested the idea of
extending NAFTA to the whole western hemisphere. 69 They caution against any
radical liberalization or market integration whose side effects, such as social cost
due to massive adjustment, would trump any potential gains of such mergers.7 °
These predicaments are attributable to the fact that most of those merger
projects have not yet been concluded. Concomitantly, such a poor record
rehighlights the significance of the WTO as a vehicle for further trade
liberalization.
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3. Judicial Convergence
The institutional modes of multilateralization discussed above--opening
regionalism and merging different RTAs-are not necessarily easy options for
turning club goods into public goods. A hefty amount of political capital would
be necessary to initiate and to conclude these projects. Often, the negotiation
process would deadlock as political battles among interest groups prevent
politicians from taking action. Once losing momentum, the negotiation could be
easily buried in politically convenient collective obliviousness.
However, without ever creating a new hardware of multilateralization,
regional trade tribunals could generate certain positive externalities to the global
trading system by modifying their software, or judicial interpretation, in a way
that coheres with the WTO tribunal. In other words, regional trade tribunals can
interpret RTA provisions in a way which avoids any conflicts with the WTO
jurisprudence.71 Such judicial convergence or coherence will provide global
business with a desirable level of predictability and certainty that enables
businesspeople to design their transnational business plans with comfort and
confidence. The very existence of such a coherent legal system is a valuable
public good to global business and thus a road to prosperity.
In fact, NAFTA tribunals have already demonstrated this propitious
possibility. In one case, a NAFTA Chapter 20 panel (Tariffs Applied by Canada to
Certain US-Origin AgriculturalProducts) avoided a possible legal clash with WTO
norms through a holistic interpretation that configured NAFTA and the WTO
in the same teleological space-free trade.72 In this case, Canada raised its
agricultural tariffs, which on its face would have violated Article 302(1) of
NAFTA (prohibiting the tariff increase). Yet Canada did so in the pursuit of the
"tariffication" mechanism that converts nontariff barriers (such as quotas) to
tariffs under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The rationale of tariffication
is that tariffs would be superior to quotas, even as a trade barrier, on account of
the predictability of their impact on the market. While the US accused Canada of
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violating Article 302(1), the panel unanimously exonerated Canada by
interpreting the NAFTA's raison d'Etre in a coherent fashion with that of the
WTO. 73 Having observed that WTO tariffication does further the NAFTA
objective of trade liberalization, the panel viewed that the tariffication
mechanism withstood any technical violation of Article 302(1). 74
In the same context, a recent NAFTA Chapter 19 panel (Certain Softwood
Lumber Productsfrom Canada: FinalAffirmative Antidumping Determination ("Softwood
Lumber")) upheld the WTO case law in an antidumping dispute.7" In calculating
overall dumping margins that determine the amount of antidumping duties, the
US had long ignored any negative individual dumping margins (export prices
minus normal values) and selectively included positive individual dumping
margins (normal values minus export prices).76 Under this practice, labeled
"zeroing," overall dumping margins tended to be inflated since any negative
individual dumping margins failed to offset any positive individual dumping
margins, resulting in higher dumping rates (antidumping duties). While the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has ruled that the zeroing methodology
is a reasonable interpretation by the Department of Commerce,77 the WTO
Appellate Body has struck it down in a series of recent cases.78
The NAFTA Softwood Lumber panel referred to this WTO jurisprudence
and invalidated the zeroing methodology.79 Binational review under NAFTA
Chapter 19 replaces judicial review of final antidumping determinations by an
importing country's court.8" The binational panel should apply "the general legal
81
principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply."
Therefore, the Softwood Lumber panel applied the celebrated Charming Betsy
doctrine, which requires the US courts to interpret domestic law in a way which

73

Id at

167.

74 Id at T 208.
75

76
77
78

NAFTA Binational Panel Review, Certain Softwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada: Final Affirmative
Anidumpig Determination 43-44, Panel No USA-CDA-2002-1904-2 (une 9, 2005) ("Softwood
Lumber').
19 CFR § 351.414(c)(2) (2007).
Corus Staal BA v United States, 395 F3d 1343 (Fed Cir 2005); Timken Co v United States, 354 F3d
1334, 1343-44 (Fed Cir 2004).
See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India
54-55, WTO Doc No WT/DS141/AB/R
(Mar 1, 2001); World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, US-Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumberfrom Canada 183(a), WTO Doc No WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug 11,
2004).

79

Softwood Lumber at 43-44 (cited in note 75).

80

NAFTA, art 1904:1 (cited in note 23).
Id, art 1904:3.

81

Vol. 8 No. 2

GlobalIntegrationand the Complete Public Goods
82
is consistent with international law when there is room for such interpretation.
The panel found that the Commerce Department should have departed from
the zeroing practice because it could have reached another reasonable
interpretation of the US antidumping statute which would be consistent with the
WTO rulings invalidating the zeroing methodology. 3
This judicial convergence to the multilateral trade rules, which has been
voluntarily initiated by regional trade tribunals, can further be promoted. For
example, regional trade tribunals may refer those legal questions that may
concern any potential conflicts between RTAs and the WTO to the WTO
Appellate Body to seek nonbinding advisory opinions.84 Upon such request, the
Appellate Body Secretariat may respond to the referring regional trade tribunal
with its legal opinion on the issue in question to assist regional trade tribunals in
reaching WTO-consistent decisions.

V. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to complement Brummer's contribution by
shedding light on the broader implications of his article. This Article argues that
RTAs as club goods/public bads can, and should, be re-engineered into public
goods through multilateralization, which tends to reconfigure both
multilateralism and regionalism in a coherent, symbiotic, and holistic fashion.
Concededly, such multilateralization necessitates a varying degree of
institutionalization, which does not come cheap. Under certain circumstances,
the cost of internalizing negative externalities might exceed the gains from such
internalization." Nonetheless, the WTO members should diligently engage in
such multilateralization to rationalize currently prevalent RTAs within an
integrated global trading system. Long-term systematic gains from this
multilateralization would go beyond any short-term political costs of
institutionalization.
Finally, institutions, both regional and global, are alone an insufficient
condition for free trade. We are often oblivious to the fact that, most of the
time, nations liberalize trade unilaterally and voluntarily.86 Institutions, no matter
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how well-designed they may be, cannot replace an enlightened free trade policy
that boldly forsakes mercantilism for the sake of the nation's general economic
welfare. After all, institutions are means, not ends. To overemphasize
institutions risks losing sight of the fundamental thesis that international trade is
a logical extension of market competition. A well-operating market, be it
domestic or global, enshrined in a prudent government policy is the best public
good for domestic and global welfare and prosperity.
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